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A DYNKIN GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
JUKKA LEMPA AND PEKKA MATOMA¨KI
Abstract. We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time,
which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric
information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose
a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the
information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
1. Introduction
Dynkin games are game variants of optimal stopping problems, for the seminal study see [6]. Such a
game has two players, ”buyer” and ”issuer”, and both of them can stop the underlying process prior the
terminal time. In this paper we study the following formulation of the game. First, we assume that the
underlying process X is a time homogenous diffusion; we will elaborate the assumptions on X in the next
section. At the initial time t = 0, the players choose their own stopping times τ (buyer) and γ (issuer) and
at the time of the first exercise, i.e. at τ ∧ γ, the issuer pays the buyer the amount
(1.1) g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ};
we will pose assumptions on the payoff functions gi in the next section. An interpretation of this is that, at
any stopping time γ, the issuer can cancel the buyer’s right to exercise, but she has to pay the cost g2(Xγ)
to do so. Now, it is the buyers (issuers) objective to choose the stopping time τ (γ) such that the expected
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present value of the exercise payoff
(1.2) Π(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
is maximized (minimized). Here, r > 0 is the constant rate of discounting.
The objective of this paper is to study a version of this game with random time horizon, the infinite
horizon game given by the expression (1.2) being already analysed comprehensively e.g. in [1] and [8]. In
financial terminology the random time horizon game can be interpreted as a perpetual game option with
default risk, for studies on game options see e.g. [7], [12] and [13]. We remark that our problem can be
regarded also as a Canadized version of a finite horizon game – for studies considering Canadization of options,
see [4], [13] and [14]. To introduce the random time horizon, we assume that, in addition to the diffusion X ,
there is also an independent Poisson process N defined on the underlying probability space. Furthermore,
we assume that the game expires at the first jump time of the Poisson process, that is we assume that the
game has an exponentially distributed random time horizon. The existence of the terminating event and its
rate is assumed to be known to the players, while the information of it is asymmetric: we assume that the
occurrence of the expiring event is observable only to one of the players. Here, the information asymmetry
has an interpretation as inside information. Indeed, the player who observes the default taking place has
more information than is commonly available on the market and can be considered as an insider. We make
a distinction between the cases when either buyer (Game 1) or issuer (Game 2) observes the jump of the
Poisson process and study both of these cases separately.
Our approach to the problem is built on Markovian approach to Dynkin games. There is a substantial
literature in this area highlighting various parts of the theory. For instance, studies [1] and [2] are concerned
with deriving explicit characterization for the value and saddle point equilibrium using classical theory of
diffusions and standard nonlinear programming techniques. A generalized concavity approach is used in [7]
and [8] to produce the optimal solution via the theory of excessive functions. In [9] and [17], the authors
study equilibrium properties of Dynkin games under very general Markovian setup. Our setup and approach
is closely related to [1] and can be regarded as a partial extension of it. We start our analysis by first deriving
partly heuristically a free boundary problem which gives us a candidate for the solution. To set up the free
boundary problem, we assume that the optimal continuation region is an interval with compact closure with
constant thresholds. Given the time homogeneity of the diffusion X and the fact that the discount rate r and
the jump rate of N are constants, this is indeed a reasonable assumption.
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We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for Games
1 and 2. We also carry out a comparison of the solutions showing that whenever Games 1 and 2 have a
saddle point solution, the value of Game 1 dominates the value of Game 2. Furthermore, we show that if the
payoff g2 is non-negative, the value of the infinite horizon game dominates both the value of Game 1 and 2.
Interestingly, we find that if g2 admits also negative values, then the value of the infinite horizon game can
even be the smallest of the three. We discuss also the symmetric information case where the expiring event
is not observable to either of the players – denote this as Game 3. In this case, we find that the value is in
between the values of Game 1 and Game 2. We also show that the optimal continuation regions of Games 1
– 3 are related in a way that can be described as follows: If you are able to observe the terminating event,
you will wait longer – The more you know, the longer you wait.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the underlying dynamics and
introduce the Dynkin games. In Sections 3 and 4 we study the solvability of the games and discuss some
implications of the information asymmetry. In Section 5 we compare the optimal solutions of the games and
study limiting behavior of the solutions. In Section 6 we illustrate the main results of the study with an
explicit example.
2. The Games
2.1. Underlying Dynamics. Let (Ω,F ,F,P), with F = {Ft}t≥0, be a complete filtered probability space
satisfying the usual conditions, see [3], p. 2. In addition, let W be a Wiener process on (Ω,F ,F,P). We
assume that the state process X is a regular linear diffusion defined on (Ω,F ,F,P), evolving on R+, and
given as the solution of the Itoˆ equation
(2.1) dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x,
where the coefficients µ : R+ → R and σ : R+ → R+ are assumed to be sufficiently smooth to guarantee the
existence of a unique (weak) solution of (2.1), see [3], pp. 46 – 47. In line with most economical and financial
applications, we assume that X does not die inside the state space R+, i.e., that killing of X is possible only
at the boundaries 0 and ∞. Therefore the boundaries 0 and ∞ are either natural, entrance, exit or regular.
In the case a boundary is regular, it is assumed to be killing, see [3], pp. 18–20, for a characterization of the
boundary behavior of diffusions. The assumption that the state space is R+ is done for reasons of notational
convenience. In fact, we could assume that the state space is any interval I in R and all our subsequent
analysis would hold with obvious modifications. Denote as A = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2
+µ(x) d
dx
the differential operator
associated to the process X . For notational convenience we denote Gβ = A− β for a given constant β > 0.
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For any given constant β > 0, we denote as Lβ1 the class of real valued measurable functions f on R+
satisfying the condition
Ex
{∫ ζ
0
e−βt |f(Xt)| dt
}
<∞,
where ζ := inf{t > 0 : Xt /∈ R+} denotes the lifetime of X . In addition, for any given constant β > 0, we
denote, respectively, as ψβ and ϕβ the increasing and the decreasing solution of the ordinary second-order
linear differential equation Gβu(x) = 0 defined on the domain of the characteristic operator of X – for the
characterization and fundamental properties of the minimal β-excessive functions ψβ and ϕβ , see [3], pp.
18–20. Denote as Bβ =
ψ′β(x)
S′(x) ϕβ(x) −
ϕ′β(x)
S′(x) ψβ(x) the Wronskian determinant, where
S′(x) = exp
(
−
∫ x 2µ(y)
σ2(y)
dy
)
denotes the density of the scale function of X , see [3], p. 19. We remark that the value of the Wronskian does
not depend on the initial state x but on the constant β. For a function f ∈ Lβ1 , the resolvent Rβf : R+ → R
is defined as
(2.2) (Rβf)(x) = Ex
{∫ ζ
0
e−βtf(Xt)dt
}
,
for all x ∈ R+. The resolvent Rβ and the solutions ψβ and ϕβ are connected in a computationally very useful
way. Indeed, we know from the literature, see [3], pp. 17 – 20 and p. 29, that for given f ∈ Lβ1 the resolvent
Rβf can be expressed as
(Rβf)(x) = B
−1
β ϕβ(x)
∫ x
0
ψβ(y)f(y)m
′(y)dy +B−1β ψβ(x)
∫ ∞
x
ϕβ(y)f(y)m
′(y)dy,
for all x ∈ R+, where m′(x) = 2σ2(x)S′(x) denotes the speed density of X .
To close the subsection, we denote as N a Poisson process with intensity λ > 0, and assume that N is
independent of the underlying X . Now, the first jump time T of N is an exponentially distributed random
time with mean 1
λ
. Denote as Fˆ =
{
Fˆt
}
t≥0
the enlarged filtration defined as Fˆt = Ft ∨ σ({T ≤ s} : s ≤ t).
In other words, the filtration Fˆ carries the information of the evolution of underlying X and the first jump
of the Poisson process N . We denote as T0 as the set of all F-stopping times and as T1 the set T0 augmented
with T , i.e., the set of all Fˆ-stopping times.
2.2. The Games. Dynkin game is an optimal stopping game between two players, ”buyer” and ”issuer”. In
contrast to classical optimal stopping problems, also the issuer can now exercise. Recall now the definition
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of the expected present value of the exercise payoff from (1.2). Throughout the study, we make the following
standing assumptions for the payoffs gi.
Assumption 2.1. We assume that the payoffs gi : R+ → R, i = 1, 2, 3, are continuous and non-decreasing
functions satisfying the ordering g1 ≤ g3 ≤ g2 and that g1 is bounded from below. Furthermore, we assume
that gi ∈ Lr1 and gi ∈ C1(R+) ∩ C2(R+ \D), where the set D is finite.
In order to propose a value and notions of equilibrium for the considered games, define first the lower
and upper values V and V as
(2.3) V (x) = sup
τ∈T
inf
γ∈T
Π(x, τ, γ), V (x) = inf
γ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Π(x, τ, γ),
where T is the class of admissible stopping times. Following [8], pp. 1578, we remark that g1 ≤ V ≤ V ≤ g2.
If, on the other hand, the values satisfy V ≥ V , we say that the game has the value V := V = V , i.e. has a
Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, if there exists stopping times τ∗ and γ∗ such that
Π(x, τ, γ∗) ≤ Π(x, τ∗, γ∗) ≤ Π(x, τ∗, γ),
for all x ∈ R+, then the pair (τ∗, γ∗) constitutes the saddle point, i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the game.
We remark that the existence of the saddle point implies the existence of the value but the converse does
not hold in general – for a study addressing this problem in a general Markovian setting, see [9]. However,
in our setting the underlying process is nice enough so that Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to Nash
equilibrium.
The main objective of this paper is to study two Dynkin games which are associated via a certain type of
information asymmetry. To make a precise statement, recall the Poisson process N from the previous section.
At the initial time t = 0, the underlying X and exogenous N are both started. At the first jump time T ,
the game ends. Thus, the considered games have an exponentially distributed random time horizon which is
independent of X . The information asymmetry is introduced as follows: we assume that the occurrence of
the expiring event is observable only to one of the players. Let us formalize this setting first in the case when
T is observable to the buyer ; later this case will be referred to as Game 1. First, recall the definitions of the
sets T0 and T1 from the previous subsection. At the start of the game, issuer choose a stopping time from set
T0 and the buyer from the set T1. The expected present value Π1 of the exercise payoff is written as
(2.4) Π1(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]
1{τ∧γ≤T}
}
,
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and the upper and lower values are defined as
(2.5) V 1(x) = sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ), V 1(x) = inf
γ∈T0
sup
τ∈T1
Π1(x, τ, γ).
For Game 1, we denote the value function as V1 and the saddle point equilibrium as (τ
∗
1 , γ
∗
1 ).
The setup of the second game, which will be referred to as Game 2, is completely analogous. For Game 2,
we assume that the random time T is a stopping time to issuer. Similarly to Game 1, we define the expected
present value Π2 of the exercise payoff as
(2.6) Π2(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]
1{γ∧τ≤T}
}
,
and the upper and lower values are defined as
(2.7) V 2(x) = sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T1
Π2(x, τ, γ), V 2(x) = inf
γ∈T1
sup
τ∈T0
Π2(x, τ, γ).
Analogously to Game 1, the value function of Game 2 is denoted as V2 and the saddle point equilibrium as
(τ∗2 , γ
∗
2 ).
3. Game 1
3.1. Equivalent formulation of the game. First, we introduce some additional definitions and notations.
Following [1] (see also [19]), define the operators Lβψ and L
β
ϕ for sufficiently smooth functions f : R+ → R as
(3.1)


(Lβψf)(x) =
f ′(x)
S′(x)
ψβ(x)−
ψ′β(x)
S′(x)
f(x),
(Lβϕf)(x) =
f ′(x)
S′(x)
ϕβ(x)−
ϕ′β(x)
S′(x)
f(x),
for a given constant β > 0. In order to simplify the upcoming notation, define the functions gˆi : R+ → R,
i = 1, 2, as
(3.2)


gˆ1(x) = g1(x) − λ(Rr+λg+1 )(x),
gˆ2(x) = g2(x) − λ(Rr+λg+1 )(x),
where g+1 (x) = max{g1(x), 0}. We remark that since we assumed g1 ≤ g2, also gˆ1 ≤ gˆ2.
In this subsection, we transform Game 1 into an adjusted perpetual game and study its solvability. To
this end, we derive first a candidate G1 for the optimal value function in a partly heuristic way – for a related
study in a different context, see [10]. We start with the ansatz that the game has a saddle point equilibrium.
Because the exponential distribution has memoryless property and the underlying dynamic structure is time
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homogeneous, we assume that the state space R+ is partitioned into continuation and action regions, where
the continuation region (z∗1 , y
∗
1) ⊂ R+ has compact closure. If x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1), the players wait by definition.
Now, in an infinitesimal time interval dt, the Poisson process jumps (expiring the exercise opportunities)
with probability λdt. Because the buyer can exercise at time T , she will exercise at that time if and only if
g1 ≥ 0; this yields the terminal payoff g+1 (x). On the other hand, with probability 1− λdt the contract lives
on yielding additional expected present value. Denote as G1 the candidate for the value function. Formally,
this suggests with a heuristic use of Dynkin’s theorem, see e.g. [16], that
G1(x) = g
+
1 (x)λdt + (1 − λdt)Ex[e−rdtG1(Xdt)] = λg+1 (x)dt+ (1 − λdt)[G1(x) + GrG1(x)dt]
= G1(x) + GrG1(x)dt + λ(g+1 (x) −G1(x)),
for all x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1) under the intuition dt2 = 0. This yields the condition
(3.3) Gr+λG1(x) = −λg+1 (x),
for all x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1). The solutions of the equation (3.3) can be expressed as G1(x) = λ(Rr+λg+1 )(x) +
c1ψr+λ(x) + c2ϕr+λ(x) for some positive constants c1 and c2. We assume that the candidate G1 satisfies the
value-matching condition, i.e., is continuous over the boundary of (z∗1 , y
∗
1). This condition can be expressed
as 

λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(z
∗
1) + c1ψr+λ(z
∗
1) + c2ϕr+λ(z
∗
1) = g2(z
∗
1),
λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(y
∗
1) + c1ψr+λ(y
∗
1) + c2ϕr+λ(y
∗
1) = g1(y
∗
1).
Using the notation from (3.2), it is a matter of elementary algebra to show that
(3.4)


c1 =
ϕr+λ(y
∗
1)gˆ2(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)gˆ1(y∗1)
ϕr+λ(y∗1)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)ψr+λ(y∗1)
:= h1(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1)
c2 =
ψr+λ(z
∗
1)gˆ1(y
∗
1)− ψr+λ(y∗1)gˆ2(z∗1)
ϕr+λ(y∗1)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)ψr+λ(y∗1)
:= h2(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1).
To proceed, denote as τ(z∗1 ,y∗1 ) the first exit time of X from the interval (z
∗
1 , y
∗
1). We know from [5], Theorem
13.11, p. 46–47, that the function x 7→ Ex
[
e
−(r+λ)τ(z∗1 ,y
∗
1 )
]
solves the boundary value problem Gr+λu(x) = 0
on (z∗1 , y
∗
1) with boundary conditions u(z
∗
1) = u(y
∗
1) = 1. Using this, we find that
Ex
{
e
−(r+λ)(τy∗
1
∧γz∗
1
)
1{τy∗
1
<γz∗
1
}
}
=
ϕr+λ(x)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)ψr+λ(x)
ϕr+λ(y∗1)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)ψr+λ(y∗1)
,
Ex
{
e
−(r+λ)(τy∗1
∧γz∗1
)
1{τy∗1>γz∗1 }
}
=
ϕr+λ(y
∗
1)ψr+λ(x)− ϕr+λ(x)ψr+λ(y∗1)
ϕr+λ(y∗1)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− ϕr+λ(z∗1)ψr+λ(y∗1)
,
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see also [15]. Consequently, the candidate G1 can be rewritten as
G1(x) = λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) + gˆ1(y
∗
1)Ex
{
e
−(r+λ)(τy∗1
∧γz∗1
)
1{τy∗
1
<γz∗
1
}
}
+ gˆ2(z
∗
1)Ex
{
e
−(r+λ)(τy∗1
∧γz∗1
)
1{τy∗1>γz∗1 }
}
,
(3.5)
for all x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1). Since the sample paths of X are (almost surely) continuous, an application of the strong
Markov property of the underlying X yields
G1(x) = Ex
{
λ
∫ τy∗1∧γz∗1
0
e−(r+λ)sg+1 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τy∗1
∧γz∗1
)
[
g1(Xτy∗1
)1{τy∗1<γz∗1 }
+ g2(Xγz∗1
)1{τy∗1>γz∗1 }
]}(3.6)
for all x ∈ R+. This result indicates the form of the equivalent perpetual game. The next proposition
confirms that this partly heuristic derivation gives the correct form of the adjusted perpetual problem. For
a rigorous proof we though need an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For τ ∈ T1, there exists τ ′ ∈ T0 such that τ ∧ T = τ ′ ∧ T a.s.
Proof. See [18], Lemma, Section VI.3, p. 378. 
Proposition 3.2. The upper and lower values for Game 1 can be rewritten as
V 1(x) = inf
γ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
Π˜1(x, τ, γ), V 1(x) = sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T0
Π˜1(x, τ, γ),
where
Π˜1(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
λ
∫ τ∧γ
0
e−(r+λ)sg+1 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
for all x ∈ R+.
Proof. Let Tˆ1 denote the set containing Fˆ-stopping times satisfying τ ≤ T for all ω. We know that for all
τ ∈ Tˆ1, there is a τ ′ ∈ T1 for which τ ′ = τ ∧T . Because buyer’s objective is to maximize the expected present
value of the payoff and she is aware that after the observable expiry time T the payoff will be zero, we reason
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that
V1(x) = sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)[g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}]1{τ∧γ≤T}
}
= sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)
[
(g1(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τ≥T})1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]
1{τ∧γ≤T}
}
= sup
τˆ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r(τˆ∧γ)
[
(g1(Xτˆ )1{τˆ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τˆ≥T})1{τˆ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τˆ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τˆ=γ}
]
1{τˆ∧γ≤T}
}
= sup
τˆ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r(τˆ∧γ)
[
(g1(Xτˆ )1{τˆ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τˆ≥T})1{τˆ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τˆ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τˆ=γ}
]}
= sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r((τ∧T )∧γ)
[
(g1(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τ≥T})1{τ∧T<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ∧T>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ∧T=γ}
]}
(3.7)
Now, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that the last expression is equivalent with the form
sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T0
Ex
{
e−r((τ∧T )∧γ)
[ (
g1(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τ≥T})
)
1{τ∧T<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ∧T>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ∧T=γ}
]}
.
Finally, let τ, γ ∈ T0. Since T is independent of X , we conclude that
Ex
{
e−r((τ∧T )∧γ)
[ (
g1(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g
+
1 (XT )1{τ≥T})
)
1{τ∧T<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ∧T>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ∧T=γ}
]
(1{τ≥T} + 1{τ<T})
}
=Ex
{
e−rT g+1 (XT )1{τ∧γ≥T} + e
−r(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]
1{τ∧γ<T}
}
=Ex
{
λ
∫ τ∧γ
0
e−(r+λ)sg+1 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
,
for all x ∈ R+. This computation proves the claimed result for the lower value V 1. The result for the upper
value V 1 is proved completely similarly. 
In Proposition 3.2 we showed that the random horizon game can be transformed into an equivalent
adjusted perpetual game. Moreover, we observe that the form the value function (3.6) associated with
constant threshold policy is consistent with Proposition 3.2. It is also worth mentioning that the buyer follows
actually a stopping rule ”Stop at time τ ∧ T” which results into the payoff g1(Xτ )1{τ<T} + g+1 (XT )1{τ≥T}.
This property was used in (3.7).
3.2. Necessary Conditions. Having the expression (3.6) at hand, we proceed with the derivation of neces-
sary conditions. Define the function Q1 : R
3
+ → R+ as
Q1(x, z, y) = Ex
{
e−(r+λ)(τy∧γz)
[
gˆ1(Xτy)1{τy<γz} + gˆ2(Xγz)(Xγz ))1{τy>γz}
]}
= h1(z, y)ψr+λ(x) + h2(z, y)ϕr+λ(x),
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recall the definition of the functions gˆi and hi, i = 1, 2, from (3.2) and (3.4), respectively (see [1], expression
(15)). Function Q1 is the value function associated to the strategy constituted by the first hitting times τy and
γz to arbitrary boundaries y and z satisfying z < y. We assume now that the thresholds z
∗
1 and y
∗
1 give rise
to an extremal expression for Q1 in the sense that for all fixed (initial) state x, the point (z
∗
1 , y
∗
1) is a saddle
point for the surface (z, y) 7→ Q1(x, z, y). In other words, given the family of surfaces (z, y) 7→ Q1(x, z, y),
indexed by the initial states x, we assume that the point (z∗1 , y
∗
1) is saddle point for all of these surfaces. To
determine first order necessary conditions for the saddle point, denote as xo the unique point satisfying the
condition ψr+λ(xo) = ϕr+λ(xo). Now, the conditions
∂Q1
∂z
(xo, z
∗
1 , y
∗
1) =
∂Q1
∂y
(xo, z
∗
1 , y
∗
1) = 0 result into
(3.8)


∂h1
∂z
(z∗1 , y
∗
1) +
∂h2
∂z
(z∗1 , y
∗
1) = 0,
∂h1
∂y
(z∗1 , y
∗
1) +
∂h2
∂y
(z∗1 , y
∗
1) = 0.
Using the notation from (3.1), we find after differentiation and some elementary manipulations that the
conditions (3.8) can be rewritten as


(Lr+λϕ gˆ2)(z
∗
1)ψr+λ(y
∗
1)− (Lr+λψ gˆ2)(z∗1)ϕr+λ(y∗1) = Br+λgˆ1(y∗1),
(Lr+λϕ gˆ1)(y
∗
1)ψr+λ(z
∗
1)− (Lr+λψ gˆ1)(y∗1)ϕr+λ(z∗1) = Br+λgˆ2(z∗1),
(3.9)
Following [1], Lemma 4.1, we readily verify that the conditions (3.9) can be expressed as


∫ y∗1
z∗1
(Gr+λgˆ2)(t)(ϕr+λ(t)− ϕr+λ(y∗1 )ψr+λ(y∗1 )ψr+λ(t)
)
m′(t)dt = B
ψr+λ(y∗1 )
(gˆ2(y
∗
1)− gˆ1(y∗1)) ,∫ y∗1
z∗1
(Gr+λgˆ1)(t)(ψr+λ(t)− ψr+λ(z∗1 )ϕr+λ(z∗1 )ϕr+λ(t)
)
m′(t)dt = B
ϕr+λ(z∗1 )
(gˆ1(z
∗
1)− gˆ2(z∗1)) .
(3.10)
Denote now the candidate
(3.11) G1(x) =


g1(x), x ≥ y∗1 ,
λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) +Q1(x, z
∗
1 , y
∗
1), x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1),
g2(x), x ≤ z∗1 .
Finally, the r-harmonicity of the candidate G1 on the continuation region (z
∗
1 , y
∗
1) implies that the necessary
conditions (3.8) can be rewritten as
(3.12)


(Lr+λϕ gˆ2)(z
∗
1)− (Lr+λϕ gˆ1)(y∗1) = 0,
(Lr+λψ gˆ2)(z
∗
1)− (Lr+λψ gˆ1)(y∗1) = 0,
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see also [1], Corollary 4.2.
The next proposition contains our main result on the necessary conditions for the optimal solution for
Game 1.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that there is a pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1) satisfying the conditions (3.12) and that there exist
thresholds xˆi, i = 1, 2, such that
(3.13) Gr+λgˆi(x) T 0, whenever x S xˆi.
Then the pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1) is unique and z
∗
1 < xˆ2 and xˆ1 < y
∗
1 . Moreover the value of Game 1 reads as V1(x) =
G1(x) for all x ∈ R+, where G1 is defined in (3.11).
Proof. We know from [1], Theorem 4.3 that under assumption (3.13) a pair satisfying (3.12) is necessary
unique and that z∗1 < xˆ2 and xˆ1 < y
∗
1 . To prove that the value of the game reads as (3.11), we follow the
lines of the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [1]. First, assume that x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1) and define the functionals
∆1(x) = λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) + h1(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1)ψr+λ(x) + h2(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1)ϕr+λ(x) − g1(x)
= gˆ2(z
∗
1)
ϕˆy∗1 (x)
ϕˆy∗1 (z
∗
1)
+ gˆ1(y
∗
1)
ψˆz∗1 (x)
ψˆz∗1 (y
∗
1)
− gˆ1(x)
∆2(x) = λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) + h1(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1)ψr+λ(x) + h2(z
∗
1 , y
∗
1)ϕr+λ(x) − g2(x)
= gˆ2(z
∗
1)
ϕˆy∗1 (x)
ϕˆy∗1 (z
∗
1)
+ gˆ1(y
∗
1)
ψˆz∗1 (x)
ψˆz∗1 (y
∗
1)
− gˆ2(x),
where
ϕˆy(x) = ϕr+λ(x) − ϕr+λ(y)
ψr+λ(y)
ψr+λ(x),
ψˆz(x) = ψr+λ(x) − ψr+λ(z)
ϕr+λ(z)
ϕr+λ(x).
The saddle point condition (3.8) implies that the candidate G1 is once continuously differentiable in R+ and,
consequently, that ∆1(y
∗
1) = ∆
′
1(y
∗
1) = 0 = ∆2(z
∗
1) = ∆
′
2(z
∗
1). By standard differentiation we find that
d
dx
[
∆1(x)
ψˆz∗1 (x)
]
=
S′(x)
ψˆ2z∗1
(x)
[
−Bgˆ2(z∗1)
ϕr+λ(z∗1)
− gˆ
′
1(x)
S′(x)
ψˆz∗1 (x) +
ψˆ′z∗1 (x)
S′(x)
gˆ1(x)
]
,
d
dx
[
∆2(x)
ϕˆy∗1 (x)
]
=
S′(x)
ϕˆ2y∗1
(x)
[
Bgˆ1(y
∗
1)
ψr+λ(y∗1)
− gˆ
′
2(x)
S′(x)
ϕˆy∗1 (x) +
ϕˆ′y∗1 (x)
S′(x)
gˆ2(x)
]
,
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which imply together with (3.10) that
d
dx
[
∆1(x)
ψˆz∗1 (x)
]
=
S′(x)
ψˆ2z∗1
(x)
∫ y∗1
x
ψˆz∗1 (t)
(Gr+λgˆ1)(t)m′(t)dt < 0,
d
dx
[
∆2(x)
ϕˆy∗1 (x)
]
= − S
′(x)
ϕˆ2y∗1
(x)
∫ x
z∗1
ϕˆy∗1 (t)
(Gr+λgˆ2)(t)m′(t)dt < 0.
(3.14)
To see that the inequalities in (3.14) hold, we observe first using (3.10) that
(
∆1
ψˆz∗1
)′
(z∗1) < 0 and
(
∆2
ϕˆy∗1
)′
(y∗1) <
0. Moreover, since 0 < z∗1 < xˆ2 and xˆ1 < y
∗
1 <∞, where xˆ2 and xˆ1 are given in (3.13), and x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1), the
examination of the derivatives of the integrals reveals that the inequalities in (3.14) hold.
To conclude, we observe first that the condition (3.14) implies that ∆1(x)
ψˆz∗1
(x)
≥ ∆1(y∗1 )
ψˆz∗1
(y∗1 )
= 0. Furthermore,
since ψˆz∗1 (x) > 0, we find that ∆1(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1). Similarly we find that ∆2(x) ≤ 0 for all
x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1). These properties of ∆i imply that g1(x) ≤ G1(x) ≤ g2(x) for all x ∈ (z∗1 , y∗1). Moreover, since
z∗1 < xˆ2 and y
∗
1 > xˆ1, we observe that G1 is r-superharmonic on (z
∗
1 ,∞) where the value is strictly smaller
than g2(x) and r-subharmonic on (0, y
∗
1) where the value is strictly larger than g1(x). Thus the thresholds z
∗
1
and y∗1 give rise to a unique saddle point strategy and the value V1(x) = G1(x) for all x ∈ R+.

In Proposition 3.3 we showed that given the additional condition (3.13), a solution of the pair (3.12)
is necessarily unique. From a practical point of view this is a convenient result. Indeed, if we attempt to
solve the pair (3.12) numerically for a particular example and our scheme converges to a solution, we can
be sure that it is the unique optimal one. The condition (3.13) was needed in the proof of Proposition 3.3
to assure that functionals Lr+λ· gˆi behave nicely enough for the uniqueness result to hold - remember that
(Lr+λgˆi)
′(x) ∝ (Gr+λgˆi)(x). We propose in the next lemma a set of sufficient conditions for the assumption
(3.13).
Lemma 3.4. Assume that there are thresholds x˜i, i = 1, 2, such that
Grgi(x) T 0, whenever x S x˜i.
In addition, assume that
• g1(x) ≥ 0 for all x > 0 or that Grg1 is non-increasing, and
• (g+1 − g2) and Grg2 are non-increasing.
Then the condition (3.13) holds.
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Proof. The result follows from the expressions Gr+λgˆ1 = Grg1 + λ(g+1 − g1), where g+1 − g1 is non-increasing
and Gr+λgˆ2 = Grg2 + λ(g+1 − g2). 
We note also from Proposition 3.3 that the stopping times τy∗1 and γz∗1 do not tell the entire story about
the optimal stopping rules. Indeed, the optimal stopping rule for the issuer is ”stop at time γz∗1 = inf{t ≥ 0 |
Xt ≤ z∗1}”, but for the buyer optimal rule is ”stop at time τy∗1 = inf{t ≥ 0 | Xt ≥ y∗1}, but if T < τy∗1 , stop at
time T whenever g1(XT ) > 0” so that the optimal rule for the buyer is not pure threshold rule.
While Proposition 3.3 catches a relatively large range of problems, our assumptions are not usually
satisfied if exercise payoffs have option characteristics – for example if gi(x) = (x− ci)+, where c1 > c2 > 0.
In the next result we propose a set of necessary conditions for a class of problems of this kind.
Corollary 3.5. Assume that there exists x¯i < xˆi so that gi(x) = 0 on (0, x¯i), (Cr+λgˆi) > 0 on (x¯i, xˆi), and
(Cr+λgˆi) < 0 on (xˆi,∞), i = 1, 2. Assume also that the threshold
yˆ∗x¯2 = argmax
y

 gˆ1(y)ψr+λ(y)− ψr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(y)


exists. If there exists a pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1) ∈ (x¯2, xˆ2)× (xˆ1, yˆ∗x¯2) satisfying the first order conditions (3.12), then the
conclusion of Proposition 3.3 are satisfied and the value of the game reads as in (3.11).
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3.3 after noticing that yˆ∗x¯2 is the corner solution to the lower
equation of (3.9). 
If there does not exist an internal solution, then the pair (x¯2, yˆ
∗
x¯2
) constitutes a corner solution, which
is the saddle point solution and the solution reads as
V1(x) =


g1(x), if x ≥ yˆ∗x¯2
λ(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) +
ψr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(x)−ϕr+λ(x¯2)ψr+λ(x)
ϕr+λ(yˆ∗x¯2)ψr+λ(x¯2)−ϕr+λ(x¯2)ψr+λ(yˆ
∗
x¯2
) gˆ1(yˆ
∗
x¯2
), if x ∈ (x¯2, yˆ∗x¯2)
0, if x ≤ x¯2.
3.3. Sufficient Conditions. The main objective of this section is to propose a set of sufficient conditions
for the solvability of the game. To this end, we prove first the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let b ∈ R+. Then ψr(x)ψr(b) >
ψr+λ(x)
ψr+λ(b)
for all x < b and the function x 7→ ψr+λ(x)
ψr(x)
is monotonically
increasing.
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Proof. Let x < b <∞. From [3], p. 18, we have Ex {e−rτb} = ψr(x)ψr(b) , where τb = inf{t ≥ 0 | Xt = b}. Then
ψr(x)
ψr(b)
= Ex
{
e−rτb
}
> Ex
{
e−(r+λ)τb
}
=
ψr+λ(x)
ψr+λ(b)
.
From this we also see that ψr+λ
ψr
is monotonically increasing. 
The next theorem, which is the main result of this subsection, gives a set of conditions under which the
optimal solution for Game 1 is given by (3.12) and (3.11).
Theorem 3.7. Assume that the boundaries 0 and ∞ are natural for the underlying X, that condition (3.13)
holds, and that for i = 1, 2,
(1) Grgi ∈ Lr1,
(2) limx→∞
∣∣∣ gi(x)ψr(x)
∣∣∣ = 0,
(3) Grg1(x) > Grg2(x) for all x ∈ R+ \D.
Then there exist a unique pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1) satisfying the first order conditions (3.12) and the value V1 of Game
1 reads as in (3.11).
Proof. First, we find by coupling the assumption (3) with the inequality g2 ≥ g1 that
(3.15)
(Gr+λgˆ1)(x) = (Grg1)(x) + λ(g+1 (x)− g1(x)) > (Grg2)(x) + λ(g+1 (x) − g2(x)) = (Gr+λgˆ2)(x),
for all x ∈ R+ \D. Furthermore, since the functions gi ∈ Lr1, the assumption (1) implies that
(3.16) Gr+λgˆi = Grgi + λ(g+1 − gi) ∈ Lr+λ1 ,
for i = 1, 2. Our next objective is to show that
(3.17) lim
x→∞
(Lr+λϕ gˆi)(x) = lim
x→0
(Lr+λψ gˆi)(x) = 0.
To this end, let b ∈ R+. Since the function ψr(x)ψr+λ(x) is decreasing, see Lemma 3.6, we find
(3.18) 0 ≤ lim
x→∞
∣∣∣∣ gˆi(x)ψr+λ(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ψr(b)ψr+λ(b) limx→∞
∣∣∣∣gi(x)− λ(Rr+λg+1 )(x)ψr(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 0,
for i = 1, 2. Here, the last inequality follows from the assumption (2) and Proposition 4 from [11]. By
coupling (3.18) with (2.1) and (3.16), we find that
(Lr+λϕ gˆi)(x) = −
∫ ∞
x
ϕr+λ(y)(Gr+λgˆi)(y)m′(y)dy → 0, as x→∞,
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where the integral representation follows from [1], Corollary 3.2. In addition, since g1 and g2 are bounded
from below, Corollary 3.2 from [1] implies that
(Lr+λψ gˆi)(x) =
∫ x
0
ψr+λ(y)(Gr+λgˆi)(y)m′(y)dy → 0, as x→ 0.
Thus we have established the condition (3.17). Now, the conditions (3.13) and (3.15) – (3.17) guarantee that
the claimed result follows from [1], Theorem 4.4. 
Theorem 3.7 states a set of conditions under which a unique pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1) satisfying the first order
conditions (3.12) exists and under which the value of the Game 1 can be written as (3.11). We remark
that these conditions do not depend on the jump rate λ. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 3.4 that the
condition (3.13) can be substituted with a set of conditions that are also independent of λ. Thus, when using
our results to check whether a particular example of Game 1 has a (unique) solution, the value of λ does not
play any role.
4. Game 2
4.1. Equivalent formulation of the game. This section is devoted to the study of the solvability of Game
2. The analysis is completely analogous to the Section 3. Again, we begin with the ansatz that the game has
a saddle point equilibrium and that the continuation region (z∗2 , y
∗
2) ⊂ R+ has compact closure. Now, because
the terminal date T is observable to the issuer and she knows that after that time the buyer cannot exercise,
it is clear that she will exercise at time T if and only if g2(XT ) < 0. Thus, in an infinitesimal time interval dt,
the Poisson process jumps with probability λdt leaving the buyer with payoff g−2 (x) = min{g2(x), 0}. With
probability 1−λdt there is no jump which results in additional expected present value. Analogously to Game
1, we deduce that the candidate G2 must satisfy the condition Gr+λG2(x) = −λg−2 (x) for all x ∈ (z∗2 , y∗2) and,
consequently, the candidate can be represented as
(4.1)
G2(x) = Ex
{
λ
∫ τy∗2∧γz∗2
0
e−(r+λ)sg−2 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τy∗2
∧γz∗2
)
[
g1(Xτy∗
2
)1{τy∗2<γz∗2 }
+ g2(Xγz∗
2
)1{τy∗2>γz∗2 }
]}
for all x ∈ R+. As in Game 1, this form is the correct form of the value function for the associated perpetual
game.
Proposition 4.1. The upper and lower values can for Game 2 be rewritten as
V 2(x) = inf
γ∈T0
sup
τ∈T0
Π˜2(x, τ, γ), V 2(x) = sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T0
Π˜2(x, τ, γ),
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where
Π˜2(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
λ
∫ τ∧γ
0
e−(r+λ)sg−2 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
for all x ∈ R+.
Proof. Completely similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2. 
Similarly to Game 1, we remark that the issuer follows now a stopping rule ”Stop at time γ ∧ T” which
results into the payoff g2(Xγ)1{γ<T} + g
−
2 (XT )1{γ≥T}.
4.2. Necessary conditions. In order to simplify the notations, we denote

gˇ1(x) = g1(x) − λ(Rr+λg−2 )(x),
gˇ2(x) = g2(x) − λ(Rr+λg−2 )(x).
(4.2)
Moreover define the function Q2 : R
3
+ → R+ as
Q2(x, z, y) = Ex
{
e−(r+λ)(τy∧γz)
[
(gˇ1(Xτy )1{τy<γz} + gˇ2(Xγz)(Xγz ))1{τy>γz}
]}
= k1(z, y)ψr+λ(x) + k2(z, y)ϕr+λ(x),
where the functions k1 : R
2
+ → R are defined as
(4.3)


k1(z, y) =
ϕr+λ(y)gˇ2(z)− ϕr+λ(z)gˇ1(y)
ϕr+λ(y)ψr+λ(z)− ϕr+λ(z)ψr+λ(y) ,
k2(z, y) =
ψr+λ(z)gˇ1(y)− ψr+λ(y)gˇ2(z)
ϕr+λ(y)ψr+λ(z)− ϕr+λ(z)ψr+λ(y) .
Analogously to Section 3, we assume that for every fixed x, the (z, y)→ Q2(x, z, y) has a unique saddle
point (z∗2 , y
∗
2), which does note depend on x. Then the first order necessary conditions for this saddle point
can be written as 

(Lr+λϕ gˇ2)(z
∗
2)− (Lr+λϕ gˇ1)(y∗2) = 0,
(Lr+λψ gˇ2)(z
∗
2)− (Lr+λψ gˇ1)(y∗2) = 0.
(4.4)
The next proposition contains our main result on the necessary conditions for the optimal solution for Game
2.
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Proposition 4.2. Assume that there is a pair (z∗2 , y
∗
2) satisfying the conditions (4.4) and that there are
thresholds xˇi, i = 1, 2, such that
(4.5) Gr+λgˇi(x) T 0, whenever x S xˇi.
Then the pair (z∗2 , y
∗
2) is unique and z
∗
2 ≤ z∗1 and y∗2 ≤ y∗1 . Furthermore the value V2 of Game 2 reads as
(4.6) V2(x) =


g1(x), x ≥ y∗2 ,
λ(Rr+λg
−
2 )(x) + k1(z
∗
2 , y
∗
2)ψr+λ(x) + k2(z
∗
2 , y
∗
2)ϕr+λ(x), x ∈ (z∗2 , y∗2),
g2(x), x ≤ z∗2 ,
where the functions ki, i = 1, 2, are defined in (4.3).
Proof. Completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.3. 
Similarly to Proposition 3.3, we posed in Proposition 4.2 the additional assumption (4.5) to assure that
the functionals Lr+λ· gˇi behave well enough so that the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed. In this case,
as in Game 1, we propose sufficient conditions to (4.5) which do not depend on λ. These conditions are listed
in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Assume that there are thresholds x˜i, i = 1, 2, such that (Gr)gi(x) T 0, whenever x S x˜i. In
addition, assume that
• (Grg1) and g−2 − g1 are non-increasing, and
• (Grg2) is non-increasing or g2 ≤ 0 for all x > 0.
Then the condition (4.5) holds.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4. 
Similar to Proposition 3.3, the optimal thresholds times τy∗2 and γz∗2 do not tell the whole truth about
the optimal stopping times. The optimal stopping time for the issuer is now ”stop at time γz∗2 , but if T < γz∗2
and g2(XT ) < 0, stop at time T , else do not stop”, whilst the optimal stopping time for the buyer is ”stop at
time τy∗2 = inf{t ≥ 0 | Xt ≥ y∗2}”.
Corollary 4.4. Assume that there exists x¯i < xˇi so that gi(x) = 0 on (0, x¯i), (Cr+λgˇi) > 0 on (x¯i, xˇi), and
(Cr+λgˆi) < 0 on (xˇi,∞), i = 1, 2. Assume also that the threshold
yˇ∗x¯2 = argmax
y

 gˇ1(y)ψr+λ(y)− ψr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(y)


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exists. If there exists a pair (z∗2 , y
∗
2) ∈ (x¯2, xˇ2)× (xˇ1, yˇ∗x¯2) satisfying the first order conditions (4.4), then the
conclusion of Proposition 4.2 are satisfied and the value of the game reads as in (4.6).
Proof. Proof is similar to that of Corollary 3.5. 
If there does not exist an internal solution, then the pair (x¯2, yˇ
∗
x¯2
) constitutes a corner solution, which
is the saddle point solution and the solution reads as
V2(x) =


g1(x), if x ≥ yˇ∗x¯2
λ(Rr+λg
−
2 )(x) +
ψr+λ(x¯2)ϕr+λ(x)−ϕr+λ(x¯2)ψr+λ(x)
ϕr+λ(yˇ∗x¯2)ψr+λ(x¯2)−ϕr+λ(x¯2)ψr+λ(yˇ
∗
x¯2
) gˇ1(yˇ
∗
x¯2
), if x ∈ (x¯2, yˇ∗x¯2)
0, if x ≤ x¯2.
4.3. Sufficient conditions. The next theorem contains a set of sufficient conditions for the optimal solution
for Game 2.
Theorem 4.5. Assume that the boundaries 0 and ∞ are natural for the underlying X, that condition (4.5)
hold, and that the conditions 1–3 in Theorem 3.7 holds for i = 1, 2. Then there exist a unique pair satisfying
the first order conditions (4.4) and the value V2 of Game 2 reads as in (4.6).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.7. 
Theorem 4.5 states sufficient conditions under which an optimal pair (z∗2 , y
∗
2) uniquely exists and under
which the value of Game 2 can be expressed as in (4.6). Using Lemma 4.3 the condition (4.5) can be expressed
independent of λ. Therefore, similar to Game 1, we remark that with a particular example, the conditions of
the theorem can be checked without any reference to the jump rate λ.
5. Comparison and asymptotics
In the previous sections we studied the solvability of Games 1 and 2. In particular, we derived necessary
and sufficient conditions for the solutions to be given by (3.11) and (4.6). In this section, we study further the
properties of these solutions. In particular, we are interested in finding orderings of the stopping thresholds
and the value functions. Furthermore, we study the asymptotic behavior of the optimal characteristics with
respect to jump rate λ. To this end, we define two more Dynkin games. First of these is the infinite horizon
Dynkin game, which is defined using (1.2) and (2.3) in the absence of terminating event taking place at time
T . For a comprehensive analysis of this game, see [1]. Denote the value of this game as V and the optimal
exercise thresholds as (z∗, y∗). The second additional game is the game with random time horizon in the case
where the terminating event is not observable to either of the players – we refer to this game as Game 3. The
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upper and lower values of Game 3 are infγ∈T0 supτ∈T0 Π˜3(x, τ, γ) and supτ∈T0 infγ∈T0 Π˜3(x, τ, γ) respectively,
where
Π˜3(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
e−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
.
In fact, Game 3 is an infinite horizon game with discount rate r + λ. Hence we know from [1] that under
certain assumptions this game has a Nash equilibrium given by the unique thresholds (z∗3 , y
∗
3). We denote
the value of this game as V3. It is worth pointing out that Proposition 3.2 implies that if the function g1 is
nonpositive, the value of Game 1 coincides with the value of Game 3. Similarly, Proposition 4.1 implies that
if the function g2 is nonnegative, the value of Game 2 coincides with the value of Game 3.
5.1. Ordering of the thresholds and the values. The following proposition is our main result on the
ordering of optimal characteristics of the games.
Proposition 5.1. (A) Assume that Game 1, Game 2 and Game 3 have unique saddle point solutions. Then
the following orderings hold
• V1(x) ≥ V3(x) ≥ V2(x) everywhere.
• z∗1 ≥ z∗3 ≥ z∗2 and y∗1 ≥ y∗3 ≥ y∗2 always.
(B) If in addition the infinite horizon game has a unique saddle point solution and g2 is non-negative, then
• V (x) ≥ V1(x) ≥ V3(x) ≥ V2(x) for all x ∈ R+.
• z∗ ≥ z∗1 ≥ z∗3 ≥ z∗2 and y∗ ≥ y∗1 ≥ y∗3 ≥ y∗2 .
Proof. (A) Let us first prove the orderings between Game 1 and Game 2. Recall the definitions of Π˜1(x, τ, γ)
and Π˜2(x, τ, γ) from Propositions 3.2 and 4.1 respectively. Now
Π˜1(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
λ
∫ τ∧γ
0
e−(r+λ)sg+1 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
≥ Ex
{
λ
∫ τ∧γ
0
e−(r+λ)sg−2 (Xs)ds+ e
−(r+λ)(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]}
= Π˜2(x, τ, γ),
for all x ∈ R+ and τ, γ ∈ T0. Thus
V1(x) = sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T0
Π˜1(x, τ, γ) ≥ sup
τ∈T0
inf
γ∈T0
Π˜2(x, τ, γ) = V2(x)(5.1)
Suppose now, contrary to our claim, that y∗1 < y
∗
2 and let x ∈ (y∗1 , y∗2) so that x is in the continuation
region of Game 1, and in the stopping region of Game 2. Then V1(x) = g1(x) < V2(x), contrary to (5.1). The
same reasoning applies to the case z∗2 ≤ z∗1 . Next, recall the definition of Π˜3 from beginning of the section.
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We see that Π˜1 ≥ Π˜3 ≥ Π˜2 and using reasoning as above we find that V1 ≥ V3 ≥ V2. The claimed inequalities
for the thresholds follows as above.
(B) Let g2 be non-negative and recall the definition of Π(x, τ, γ) from (1.2). We shall compare it to
Π1 from (2.4). We know that the value function satisfies V (x) = supτ∈T0 infγ∈T0 Π(x, τ, γ) and similarly
V1(x) = supτ∈T1 infγ∈T0 Π1(x, τ, γ). Letting Tˆ1 = {τ ∈ T1 | τ ≤ T } and Tˆ c1 = T1 \ Tˆ1 we can write
V1(x) = max
{
sup
τ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ); sup
τ∈Tˆ c1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ)
}
,(5.2)
the last term being zero due to non-negativeness of g2. For the first term on the right hand side we get
sup
τ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ) = sup
τ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈T0
Π(x, τ, γ)
and again due to non-negativeness of g2 for the second term we get the inequality
sup
τ∈Tˆ c1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ) = 0 ≤ inf
γ∈T0
Π(x,∞, γ) ≤ sup
τ∈Tˆ c1
inf
γ∈T0
Π(x, τ, γ)
Substituting these to (5.2) we get
V1(x) ≤ max
{
sup
τ∈Tˆ1
inf
γ∈Tˆ0
Π(x, τ, γ); sup
τ∈T c1
inf
γ∈T0
Π(x, τ, γ)
}
= sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Π(x, τ, γ) = V (x),(5.3)
the first equality being true, since in the maximization we have two disjoint sets for which Tˆ1 ∪ Tˆ c1 = T1 and
the last equality follows from the fact that T1 = T0 in the absence of terminating event.
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that y∗ < y∗1 and let x ∈ (y∗, y∗1), so that x is in the continuation region
of stochastic time horizon case, and in the stopping region of infinite time horizon case. Then V (x) = g1(x) <
V1(x), contrary to (5.3). The same reasoning applies to the case z
∗
1 ≤ z∗. 
Intuitively, the item (A) of Proposition 5.1 is not surprising. Indeed, if the issuer has inside information
about the terminating event, it will make the value of the game smaller as there is one additional stopping
time in the set over which the issuer minimizes. Similarly, if the buyer has inside information about the
terminating event, the value will be larger. In Game 3, the value is naturally in between these two extremes.
Furthermore, the exercise thresholds are ordered as one could guess from orderings of the value functions,
the principal idea being: The more you know, the longer you wait.
The item (B) is also intuitively quite clear. Since g2 ≥ 0, there is no risk of ending up on trajectory
leading inevitably into negative payoff. By coupling this with the fact that Game 1 will end in finite time
almost surely, the ordering V ≥ V1 becomes evident as the less time to maximize the payoff which is bound
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to be nonnegative. We stress here that the positiveness of g2 is indeed required for the inequalities V ≥ V1,
z∗ ≥ z∗1 and y∗ ≥ y∗1 to hold. We will give a numerical example at the end of Section 6 where these inequalities
are reversed for a function g2 that takes also negative values.
5.2. Some asymptotics. In this subsection we study the limiting behavior of the optimal characteristics of
Games 1 and 2 when the jump rate λ tends to infinity as well as when it tends to zero. The next proposition
is our main result on this matter.
Proposition 5.2. Let x¯i be the greatest point such that gi(x¯i) = 0. The value functions Vi, i = 1, 2, and the
corresponding optimal thresholds satisfy the limiting properties
lim
λ→∞
Vi(x) = V
∞(x) :=


g1(x) if x ≥ x¯1
0 if x ∈ (x¯2, x¯1)
g2(x) if x ≤ x¯2.
and
lim
λ→0
Vi(x) = V (x) and


lim
λ→0
z∗i = z
∗
lim
λ→0
y∗i = y
∗.
Proof. We will prove the proposition only for Game 1; Game 2 is handled similarly. Let us first prove the
case λ→∞. Recall from (2.4) and (2.5) that the value of the Game 1 reads as
V1(x) = sup
τ∈T1
inf
γ∈T0
Π1(x, τ, γ) = inf
γ∈T0
sup
τ∈T1
Π1(x, τ, γ),
where Π1(x, τ, γ) = Ex
{
e−r(τ∧γ)
[
g1(Xτ )1{τ<γ} + g2(Xγ)1{τ>γ} + g3(Xγ)1{τ=γ}
]
1{τ∧γ≤T}
}
. Letting λ →
∞, we see that
Π1(x, τ, γ) = 0, if τ, γ > 0
Π1(x, τ, γ) = g1(x), if τ = 0 < γ
Π1(x, τ, γ) = g2(x), if τ > 0 = γ
Π1(x, τ, γ) = g3(x), if τ = 0 = γ.
(5.4)
In light of these findings, let us show that the claimed function V∞ is indeed the saddle point solution when
λ approaches to infinity. There are three cases to be considered depending whether x ≤ x¯2, x ∈ (x¯2, x¯1) or
x ≥ x¯1. (Note that since g2 ≥ g1, we always have x¯2 ≤ x¯1.)
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Let x ≤ x¯2. Now g1(x) ≤ g3(x) ≤ g2(x) ≤ 0 and so we can check straightforwardly, using (5.4), that
supτ∈T1 infγ∈T0 Π1(x, τ, γ) = g2(x) = infγ∈T0 supτ∈T1 Π1(x, τ, γ). The same reasoning applies also to the cases
x ∈ (x¯2, x¯1) and x ≥ x¯1, and the claimed limiting property follows.
Next we turn our eyes on the case λ→ 0. Since g+1 ∈ Lr1, we find that λ(Rr+λg+1 )(x)→ 0 as λ→ 0 for
all x ∈ R+. Given this limiting property together with the definition of V1 in (3.11), we find that the claimed
limiting property holds. Finally given the convergence result of value function V1, the claimed convergence
results hold also for the thresholds z∗1 and y
∗
1 . 
It is interesting to observe that the values of Game 1 and Game 2 are the same at the limit λ → 0
and also at λ → ∞. In the limit λ → 0, this result is intuitively plausible: If the expected waiting time for
the Poisson process to jump is infinite, the game will not expire unexpectedly, and as a result we get the
solution of an infinite horizon game. Also the limit λ→∞ has a natural explanation: There is no advantage
of observing the jump, since both players already know that the jump will occur at the time zero.
6. Explicit Example with Geometric Brownian Motion
We illustrate the main results of the study in this section with an explicit example. Let the underlying
diffusion be geometric Brownian motion, that is, let X be the solution of the Itoˆ equation
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdWt,
where W is the Wiener process. Furthermore we assume that r > µ. Further let g1(x) = x − c1 and
g2(x) = x− c2 and assume that c1 > c2 > 0, so that g2 > g1. Given this setup, we find that (Rr+λgi)(x) =
x
r+λ−µ − cir+λ .
In this case the decreasing and increasing fundamental solutions of the ordinary second order differential
equation (A− β)u = 0 are ϕβ(x) = xγ
β
1 and ψβ(x) = x
γ
β
2 respectively. Here
γβi =
1
σ2
(
1
2σ
2 − µ+ (−1)i
√
(12σ
2 − µ)2 + 2σ2β
)
,
for i = 1, 2, are the solutions of the characteristic equation 12σ
2γi(γi − 1) + µγi − r = 0. Finally, the scale
density reads as S′(x) = x−
2µ
σ2 .
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6.1. Game 1 has a solution. We know that (Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) satisfies the differential equation
1
2σ
2x2(Rr+λg
+
1 )
′′+
µx(Rr+λg
+
1 )
′ − (r + λ)(Rr+λg+1 ) = −g+1 . Therefore (Rr+λg+1 ) satisfies the following conditions:
(Rr+λg
+
1 ) =


a1ψr+λ(x) + a2ϕr+λ(x) if x ≤ c1
a3ψr+λ(x) + a4ϕr+λ(x) + (Rr+λg1)(x) if x > c1.
Since (Rr+λg
+
1 )(0+) 6= ∞, we must have a2 = 0 and since limx→∞
(
(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) − (Rr+λg1)(x)
)
= 0+, we
must have a3 = 0. Furthermore (Rr+λg
+
1 ) is continuous and differentiable. Thus the coefficients a1 and a4
can be solved from conditions limx→c1+(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) = limx→c1−(Rr+λg
+
1 )(x) and limx→c1+(Rr+λg
+
1 )
′(x) =
limx→c1−(Rr+λg
+
1 )
′(x). It is a matter of elementary calculation to show that
a1 =
1
ψr+λ(c1)
(
(Rr+λg1)(c1) +
(Rr+λg1)
′(c1)ψr+λ(c1)−(Rr+λg1)(c1)ψ
′
r+λ(c1)
ϕr+λ(c1)ψ′r+λ(c1)−ϕ
′
r+λ(c1)ψr+λ(c1)
ϕr+λ(c1)
)
a4 =
(Rr+λg1)
′(c1)ψr+λ(c1)−(Rr+λg1)(c1)ψ
′
r+λ(c1)
ϕr+λ(c1)ψ′r+λ(c1)−ϕ
′
r+λ(c1)ψr+λ(c1)
.
Next we show that the presented setup satisfies the sufficient conditions of Theorem 3.7. Since Grgi(x) =
(µ−r)x+rci, for i = 1, 2, we find that Grgi ∈ Lr1, for i = 1, 2. The assumption c1 > c2 implies that Grg1 > Grg2
– thus the conditions (1) and (3) in Theorem (3.7) hold. Moreover, since we assumed r > µ, we have that
γr2 > 1, therefore
gi(x)
ψr(x)
= x1−γ
r
2 + cix
−γr2 , for i = 1, 2, satisfy condition (2) in Theorem 3.7. Finally for the
condition (3.13) recall that gˆi = gi − λ(Rr+λg+1 ). Thus Gr+λgˆi = Grgi + λ(g+1 − gi) and we get
Gr+λgˆ1(x) =


(µ− r − λ)x + (r + λ)c1 if x < c1,
(µ− r)x + rc1 if x ≥ c1,
Gr+λgˆ2(x) =


(µ− r − λ)x + (r + λ)c2 if x < c1,
(µ− r)x + (r + λ)c2 − λc1 if x ≥ c1.
From these expressions we see that the condition (3.13) holds and xˆ1 > c1.
It follows that we can apply Theorem 3.7 and, consequently, that there exists a unique pair (z∗1 , y
∗
1)
satisfying the necessary optimality conditions (3.12). If z∗1 < c1, the conditions (3.12) can be written as (to
simplify notation, we write γi := γ
r+λ
i )

(
yγ1λa4(γ1 − γ2) + y(γ2−1)(r−µ)r+λ−µ − rγ2c1r+λ
)
yγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1(z(γ2 − 1)− γ2c2)
(
y(γ1−1)(r−µ)
r+λ−µ − rγ1c1r+λ
)
yγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1
(
z(γ1 − 1)− γ1c2 + zγ2λa1(γ2 − γ1)
)
.
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If, on the other hand, z∗1 ≥ c1, conditions (3.12) take the form

(
yγ1λa4(γ1 − γ2) + y(γ2−1)(r−µ)r+λ−µ − rγ2c1r+λ
)
yγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ2+
µ
σ2
−1
(
(γ2−1)(r−µ)z
r+λ−µ +
γ2λc1
r+λ − γ2c2 + zγ1(γ1 − γ2)λa4
)
(
y(γ1−1)(r−µ)
r+λ−µ − rγ1c1r+λ
)
yγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1
(
z(γ1−1)(r−µ)
r+λ−µ +
γ1λc1
r+λ − γ1c2
)
.
Indeed, the function (Rr+λg
+
1 ) is piecewise linear with conversion point at c1. Furthermore y
∗
1 > xˆ1 > c1
(see Proposition 3.3), but we do not know whether z∗1 < c1 or the other way around. Therefore we have two
alternative formulation for (3.12). Nevertheless, only one of these have solution, since Theorem 3.7 guarantees
the uniqueness of the solution. Furthermore at the point z = c1, these two pair of equations become the same.
Unfortunately solving the optimal boundaries from these equations explicitly does not seem to be possible.
Therefore we illustrate the results numerically. But before that, let us see through the solvability of Game 2.
6.2. Game 2 has a solution. Similarly to Game 1, we find that
(Rr+λg
−
2 )(x) =


a5ψr+λ(x) + (Rr+λg2)(x) if x < c2
a6ϕr+λ(x) if x ≥ c2,
where
a5 =
1
ψr+λ(c2)
(
−(Rr+λg2)(c2) + (Rr+λg2)
′(c2)ψr+λ(c2)−(Rr+λg2)(c2)ψ
′
r+λ(c2)
ϕ′
r+λ(c2)ψr+λ(c2)−ϕr+λ(c2)ψ
′
r+λ(c2)
ϕr+λ(c2)
)
a6 =
(Rr+λg2)
′(c2)ψr+λ−(Rr+λg2)(c2)ψ
′
r+λ(c2)
ϕ′
r+λ(c2)ψr+λ(c2)−ϕr+λ(c2)ψ
′
r+λ(c2)
.
In particular a5, a6 < 0.
Next, we verify that the sufficient conditions in Theorem 4.5 hold. We already showed with the Game
1 that the conditions (1)–(3) hold, so it suffices to check whether the condition (4.5) holds. Recall that
gˇi = gi − λ(Rr+λg−2 ) so that Gr+λgˇ1 = Grgi + λ(g−2 − gi). Thus
Gr+λgˇ1(x) =


(µ− r)x + (r + λ)c1 − λc2 if x < c2,
(µ− r − λ)x + (r + λ)c1 if x ≥ c2,
Gr+λgˇ2(x) =


(µ− r)x + rc2 if x < c2,
(µ− r − λ)x + (r + λ)c2 if x ≥ c2.
From these expressions we see that the condition (4.5) holds and xˇ1 > c2.
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Again, we can apply Theorem 4.5 and there exists a unique pair (z∗2 , y
∗
2) which satisfies the necessary
optimality condition (4.4). This time, if z∗2 < c2, the condition can be written as (to simplify notation we
write γi := γ
r+λ
i )

(
yγ1(γ1 − γ2)λa6 + y(γ2 − 1)− γ2c1
)
yγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1
(
z(r−µ)(1−γ2)
r+λ−µ − rγ2c2r+λ
)
(
y(γ1 − 1)− γ1c1
)
yγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1
(
z(r−µ)(γ1−1)
r+λ−µ − rγ1c2r+λ + zγ2(γ2 − γ1)λa5
)
.
If, on the other hand, z∗2 ≥ c2, the condition (4.4) takes the form

(
yγ1(γ1 − γ2)λa6 + y(γ2 − 1)− γ2c1
)
yγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ2+
2µ
σ2
−1
(
z(γ2 − 1)− γ2c2 + zγ1(γ1 − γ2)λa6
)
(
y(γ1 − 1)− γ1c1
)
yγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1 = zγ1+
2µ
σ2
−1(z(γ1 − 1)− γ1c2).
Similarly to Game 1, we know that y∗2 > xˇ1 > c2 (cf. Proposition 4.2), but we do not know whether z
∗
2 < c2
or not. Therefore we have two alternative formulation of (4.4), but only one of these have a solution. Again,
solving the optimal boundaries from these equations explicitly does not seem to be possible and so we are
prompted to do numerical illustrations.
6.3. Numerical illustration. To illustrate the optimal characteristics numerically, we fix the parameter
configuration µ = 0.03, r = 0.08, σ = 0.35, c1 = 3, c2 = 2 and λ = 0.1. Under this choice, the value functions
for Game 1 and Game 2 are given in Figure 1(a)–(b).
Figure 1. (a) The solution of Game 1; (b) The solution of Game 2. Now (z∗1 , y
∗
1) = (1.52, 8.34),
whereas (z∗2 , y
∗
2) = (1.34, 5.68). For comparison in infinite horizon game (z
∗, y∗) = (1.60, 8.99) so
that now z∗2 < z
∗
1 < z
∗ and y∗2 < y
∗
1 < y
∗.
The values V , V1, V2 and V3 are compared graphically in Figure 2, recall the definition of V and V3 from
Section 5.
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Figure 2. The differences V − V2, V1 − V2 and V3 − V2.
In line with Proposition 5.1, we observe that the inequalities V ≥ V1 ≥ V3 ≥ V2 hold in this case. We
point out that V ≥ V1 in this case even though g2 takes also negative values. The values V , V1 and V2
appear to differ quite significantly from each others, which indicates that the mere existence of the expiry
time and the inside information on it can have substantial impact on the optimal exercise rule. For example,
if x = 4 for the given parameters, we have V (4) ≈ 1.55 and V1(4) ≈ 1.41 the difference being 0.14, so that
V (4) is about 10% greater. However, we observe that the value V3 does not differ much from V2. This means
that in this example when the issuer have inside knowledge about Poisson clock (Game 2), she rarely takes
advantage of this information. This, in turn, is because she exercises at the jump time T only if g2(XT ) < 0.
This happens rarely, since g2 is usually positive.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the sensitivities of the exercise thresholds with respect to parameters σ and λ
in Game 1 and in the infinite horizon game. We notice that the order of the lower thresholds change as σ
increases. This is possible, since g2 takes also negative values (cf. Proposition 5.1). Moreover we see that as
σ increases, the continuation region gets wider. This result is in line with the literature. Furthermore, we
observe that the continuation region shrinks as λ increases which is again natural in the current example. In
particular, the issuer lets her exercise threshold grow towards c2 so that she could increase her chances of
exercising with negative payoff.
6.4. Counterexample for inequalities z∗1 ≤ z∗ and y∗1 ≤ y∗. In Proposition 5.1 we prove that if g2 ≥ 0,
then for the optimal stopping boundaries we have the inequalities z∗1 ≤ z∗ and y∗1 ≤ y∗ and for the values we
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Figure 3. The changes of thresholds in Game 1 and in infinite horizon game, when changing σ and λ.
have V (x) ≥ V1(x). In this subsection we show that if g2 is allowed to be negative, then these inequalities
are not necessary true, a hint of this can also be seen from Figure 3.
Let the underlying diffusion still be a geometric Brownian motion and the parameter configuration as
µ = 0.03, σ = 1.0, λ = 0.1 and r = 0.08. Furthermore, let g1 = 3
√
x − 3 and g2 =
√
x − 2; in particular,
g2 > g1. It is a straightforward task to check that there exist unique saddle point solutions for Game
1, Game 2 and infinite time horizon game and that the optimal thresholds read as (z∗1 , y
∗
1) ≈ (0.56, 44.7);
(z∗2 , y
∗
2) ≈ (0.24, 39.4) and (z∗, y∗) ≈ (0.21, 30.0). Now contrary to Proposition 5.1(B), we have z∗1 > z∗ and
y∗1 > y
∗. Moreover, we have also that z∗2 > z
∗ and y∗2 > y
∗. On the other hand, the boundaries of Game 2
are lower than the ones of Game 1, see Proposition 5.1(A). Moreover, we find that V (x) ≤ V2(x) ≤ V1(x)
which is illustrated in Figure 4.
It is interesting to observe that the value of a random time horizon game can dominate the value of an
infinite horizon game. In fact, it can be that the infinite horizon game can have the smallest value of the
games considered in this paper, which seems first rather counterintuitive. However, this is all due to the
”sufficient negativeness” of g2. Indeed, as the game will end almost surely in finite time, the issuers chances
of exercising with a very negative payoff is reduced in comparison to the infinite horizon game.
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Figure 4. The differences V − V2 and V1 − V2. We have V ≤ V2 ≤ V1 in contrast to Proposition 5.1.
Acknowledgements : The authors thank Prof. Fred Espen Benth for helpful discussions.
References
[1] Alvarez, L. H. R. A Class of Solvable Stopping Games, 2008, Appl. Math. Optim., 58, 291 – 314
[2] Alvarez, L. H. R. Minimum Guaranteed Payments and Costly Cancellation Rights: A Stopping Game Perspective, 2010,
Math. Finance, 20/4, 733 - 751
[3] Borodin, A. and Salminen P. Handbook on Brownian Motion – Facts and Formulæ, 2002, Birkha¨user, Basel
[4] Carr, P. Randomization and the American Put, 1998, Rev. Finan. Stud., 11/3 , 597 – 626
[5] Dynkin, E. Markov Processes II, 1965, Springer-Verlag, Berlin
[6] Dynkin, E. Game Variant of a problem of Optimal Stopping, 1969, Soviet Math. Dokl., 10, 270 – 274
[7] Ekstro¨m, E. Properties of game options, 2006, Math. Methods Oper. Res., 63/2, 221 – 238
[8] Ekstro¨m, E. and Villeneuve, S. On The Value of Optimal Stopping Games, 2006, Ann. Appl. Probab., 16, 1576 – 1596
[9] Ekstro¨m, E. and Peskir, G. Optimal Stopping Games for Markov Processes, 2008, SIAM J. Control Optim., 47/2, 684 -
702
[10] Jansons, K. M. and Rogers, L. C. G. Probability theory and polymer physics, 1991, J. Statist. Phys., 65, 139 – 165
[11] Johnson, T. C. and Zervos, M. The solution to a second order linear ordinary differential equation with a non-homogeneous
term that is a measure, 2007, Stochastics, 79, 363 – 382
[12] Kifer, Y. Game Options, 2000, Finance Stochastics, 4, 443 – 463
[13] Kyprianou, A. E. Some calculations for Israeli options, 2004, Finance Stochastics, 8, 73 – 86
[14] Kyprianou, A. E. and Pistorius, M. R. Perpetual options and Canadization through fluctuation theory, 2003, Ann. Appl.
Probab., 13/3, 1077 – 1098
[15] Lempa, J. A Note on Optimal Stopping of Diffusions with a Two-sided Optimal Rule, 2010, Oper. Res. Lett., 38, 11 – 16
[16] Øksendal, B. Stochastic Differential Equations, 5th Edition, 2000, Springer
[17] Peskir, G. Optimal Stopping Games and Nash Equilibrium, 2008, Theory Probab. Appl., 53/3, 623 – 638
[18] Protter, P. E. Stochastic Integration and Differential Equations, 2005, 2nd edition, Version 2.1, Springer-Verlag
[19] Salminen, P. Optimal Stopping of One-Dimensional Diffusions, 1985, Math. Nachr., 124, 85 – 101
